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Abstract
This study assessed attachment security in adults with high-functioning autism spectrum 
disorders, using the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan & Main, 1996). Of 
twenty participants, three were classified as securely attached, the same proportion as 
would be expected in a general clinical sample. Participants’ AAIs were less coherent and 
lower in reflective function than those of controls, who were matched for attachment 
status and mood disorder. A parallel interview suggested that some aspects of 
participants’ responses were influenced by their general discourse style, while other AAI 
scale scores appeared to reflect their state of mind with respect to attachment more 
specifically. There was little evidence that attachment security was related to IQ, autistic 
symptomatology or theory of mind. This study suggests that adults with autism can engage 
with the AAI and produce scoreable narratives of their attachment experiences, and a 
minority demonstrate secure attachment.
Attachment in adults with autism has, to our knowledge, not been investigated before. It is 
therefore necessary to rely on what is known about attachment in children with autism to 
provide an empirical background to the current study. The earliest theories of autism 
linked it directly with attachment, either claiming that inappropriate parenting actually 
caused or exacerbated autism (Bettelheim, 1967; Mahler, 1968; Tinbergen & Tinbergen, 
1972) or, conversely, that autism resulted in a fundamental inability to form attachments 
(Kanner, 1943). As recently as DSM-III (APA, 1980), the mandatory diagnostic criteria 
included “a pervasive lack of responsiveness to other people” (p.89), implying the absence 
of any form of attachment. These ideas were based on the general impression that those 
with autism are not particularly interested in other people, and often actively avoid 
interactions and physical contact even when they are distressed.
However, from the 1980s, researchers began using the Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978) to explore the attachments of children with 
autism spectrum disorders in a more systematic way (a number of related disorders are 
clustered with autism in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000); for simplicity I will use the term 
autism to cover all of these disorders often described as being on the autism spectrum). A 
series of studies demonstrated that children with autism showed active preferences for 
their caregivers over a stranger, that they were distressed by separations from the caregiver 
and sought proximity when they were reunited (Capps, Sigman & Mundy, 1994; Field, 
1987; Rogers, Ozonoff & Maslin-Cole, 1991, 1993; Shapiro, Sherman, Calamari & Koch, 
1987; Sigman & Mundy, 1989; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984). Sometimes these things were 
done in atypical ways, and sometimes unusual behaviour was observed that appeared to be 
unrelated to attachment, but it seemed to have been demonstrated conclusively that some 
children with autism were capable of demonstrating secure attachment. The studies were 
inconsistent in whether they found attachment security at a comparable rate to that 
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observed in typical development or children with general developmental delays. Recent 
research by van IJzendoorn et al. (2007) also demonstrated that the attachment security of 
children with high-functioning autism was not related to their parents’ sensitivity (in 
contrast to the findings in typically-developing children), but that children with better 
social functioning were more likely to be securely attached.
A meta-analysis (Rutgers, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn & van 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2004) showed that children with autism and cognitive delay are less 
likely to be classified as securely attached than typically-developing children. However, 
children with high-functioning autism (HFA; autism spectrum disorder with IQ in the 
average range or above) have normal levels of attachment security. This meta-analytic 
result is unusual because there is little evidence that cognitive delay reduces attachment 
security in children with other developmental disorders (Dissanayake & Crossley, 1996, 
1997; van IJzendoorn, Goldberg, Kroonenberg & Frenkel, 1992; Willemsen-Swinkels, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, Buitelaar, van IJzendoorn & van Engeland, 2000). So why 
should cognitive delay reduce attachment security in children with autism? One 
suggestion put forward by several authors is that autism in itself may disrupt the formation 
of secure attachments, but children with higher cognitive abilities are somehow able to 
compensate for this disruption. This suggests that, although children with HFA are 
successfully forming secure attachments, they may be doing so in a different way from 
other children, using effortful cognitive strategies to compensate for difficulties in 
automatic social and emotional responsiveness (Dissanayake & Sigman, 2001). 
Understanding mental states in autism
The best-established measure of attachment in adulthood is the Adult Attachment 
Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan & Main, 1996). It is essential in the context of this 
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research to note that AAI attachment status is strongly related to measures of people’s 
tendency and ability to consider others’ internal states (Biringen et al., 2000; Fonagy, 
Steele, Steele, Moran & Higgitt, 1991; Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy & Locker, 
2005). In the attachment literature this has become known as mentalising, and in the 
context of attachment it has been operationalised as reflective function, a manualised 
measure of “the capacity to perceive and understand oneself and others’ behaviour in 
terms of mental states” (Fonagy, Steele, Steele & Target, 1997). In autism and social 
cognition research, the same ability has traditionally been known as “theory of mind”. 
Although the tasks used, particularly in the early days of theory of mind research, differ a 
great deal from the active, flexible use of reflective function during the AAI or in 
everyday life, both concepts are attempting to characterise the same collection of skills 
used in social interactions and self-reflection. 
It is well established that there is a specific impairment in mentalising in children 
and adults with autism compared to typically developing and learning disabled controls 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; see Baron-Cohen, 2000, for a review). As a body of 
research built up, it became apparent that most people with autism fail most theory of 
mind tasks, but a proportion of them do pass some tasks, at a later age and less 
consistently than their peers. Many individuals with HFA have some success even in more 
complex and naturalistic theory of mind tasks (see Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked and 
Solomonica-Levi, 1998, for a meta-analysis). As with attachment, it appears that theory of 
mind is associated with cognitive ability in autism to a degree that is not the case in 
typical development (Happé, 1995). Children with HFA are not simply delayed in their 
acquistion of theory of mind, but appear to follow a different developmental trajectory 
(Kaland et al., 2002; Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 2005; Serra, Loth, van Geert, Hurkens & 
Minderaa, 2002). As discussed above with respect to attachment, it has become accepted 
3
that people with autism lack an intuitive ability to understand others’ mental states and so 
resort to effortful cognitive strategies (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994) which allow them 
to solve this type of problem in a different way from other people, at a later age and with 
different patterns of results.
Attachment in adults with autism - the current study
The aim of this study is to explore whether the unexpected success of children 
with autism in forming secure attachments can be replicated in adults with autism. 
Children with HFA form secure attachments at a rate comparable to typically-developing 
children, while children with autism and cognitive delay are less likely to form secure 
attachments but nevertheless a considerable proportion of them do so. Given the 
established relationship in typical development between a person’s childhood attachment 
classification and their classification in adulthood (Hamilton, 2000; Waters, Merrick, 
Treboux, Crowell & Albersheim, 2000), it might be predicted that this relationship would 
also hold true in autism. However, all of the research on attachment in autism to date has 
used the Strange Situation, or modified versions of it. The AAI relies heavily on discourse 
coherence, which is a particular difficulty for adults with autism. Also, while the Strange 
Situation is an assessment of a specific relationship with a specific other person, the AAI 
is an attempt to access internal working models of attachment relationships in general. 
The major aim of this research is to explore whether adults with HFA are able to engage 
with the AAI and to examine the patterns in their responses.
Research questions and predictions
• Can adults with autism engage with the AAI? If so, are they less likely than adults 
without autism to be classified as secure?
We considered two possible outcomes for people with autism. As their ability to discuss 
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internal states is limited (and they are generally aware of this, and may try to avoid this 
type of question), they may be unable to cope with the demands of the AAI and so be 
classified as insecure or disorganised. Alternatively, using their limited or qualitatively 
different mentalising skills, they may be able to find a way of “hacking out” the AAI 
(Happé, 1995); that is, arriving at an appropriate response via an unexpected or lengthy 
route. This suggests that their ability to respond in a “secure” way may be related to other 
abilities, for example IQ, which is known not to be the case for adults without autism.
• Will adults with autism respond to the AAI in a way that primarily reflects their 
states of mind with respect to attachment, or will their responses be more strongly 
influenced by their general discourse style?
People with autism by definition have difficulties in communication, and even very high-
functioning adults struggle with conversational pragmatics and narrative coherence 
(Diehl, Bennetto & Young, 2006; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Mundy & Markus, 
1997). Much of the AAI is based on the recall of childhood memories, and there is some 
evidence that people with autism form and retrieve memories in an idiosyncratic way 
(Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006). Therefore, even if adults with autism are able to 
form a secure state of mind with regard to attachment, it is not clear whether they will be 
able to discuss this in a way that would allow their AAI transcripts to be coded as secure. 
In this study, a parallel interview will be used as a comparison measure of discourse style: 
if an interviewee talks in an incoherent or vague way about neutral memories as well as 
about attachment, then this would appear to reflect a more general style of speech, 
whereas speaking in this way only during the AAI appears to indicate a specific state of 
mind with respect to attachment.  
• How are the AAI responses of adults with autism similar to and different from 
those of adults without autism?
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AAI transcripts are scored on a series of continuous rating scales, which aim to capture 
both the interviewee’s actual childhood experiences of attachment relationships and his 
current state of mind with regard to attachment, and prototypical profiles on these 
continuous scores are used to assign an overall category. It is possible that the autistic 
adults’ responses will not match these typical patterns: their differences in cognitive and 
verbal style might make them less able to talk coherently, relevantly and believably, or 
they may be more likely to be dismissive of discussing attachment relationships if they are 
aware of their own difficulties.
• How are AAI responses of adults with autism related to their autistic 
symptomatology, IQ and theory of mind?
To be classified as secure on the AAI requires the ability to describe events in close 
relationships and to some extent to report internal states in self and other (e.g. ‘did you 
ever feel rejected as a child?’, ‘why do you think your parents behaved in the way they 
did?’). The ability of adults with autism to provide classifiable, secure responses to the 
AAI may therefore be linked with their success in more traditional theory of mind tasks. It 
is also predicted that security of attachment as assessed by the AAI will be associated with 
IQ and degree of autistic symptomatology, in line with the theory of mind and child 
attachment studies reviewed above.
Method
Participants
Twenty participants were recruited through contact with support groups, and from 
participation in other research. Participation criteria were a diagnosis on the autism 
spectrum (including autism, pervasive developmental disorder or Asperger’s syndrome), 
IQ above 70, fluent spoken English, and age above 18 years. Full demographics are given 
in the Results section.
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Comparison group
AAI transcripts were available from two earlier studies, a group of parents whose 
children were being assessed in a community study of emotional development, where the 
parents were involved only in being given the AAI, and a group of adults with current 
mood disorder identified as part of a long-term follow-up of children in psychiatric 
services. From a sample of 39 control transcripts, 20 were selected to match the 
participants as closely as possible on the basis of attachment classification and current 
mood disorder. The intention of having a control group was to be able to compare 
response styles and patterns of scores across the continuous scales on the AAI, so the 
controls were matched for attachment classification to ensure that any differences in these 
scales were due to factors related to autism rather than the expected variation across 
different attachment categories. As AAI classification is affected by mood (Pianta, 
Egeland & Adam, 1996; Roisman, Fortuna & Holland, 2006), controls were also matched 
for mood disorder. Further details of the control group are given in the Results.
Measures
• Adult Attachment Interview
The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George et al., 1996) is a semi-structured interview 
that asks participants to recall their childhood relationships with parents and other 
attachment figures. Each AAI was audiotaped and subsequently transcribed by the 
interviewer. The AAI transcript is scored according to criteria developed by Main and 
Goldwyn (1998), on probable experience and state of mind scales. A transcript can usually 
be assigned to one of three organised attachment categories – secure/autonomous, 
insecure/dismissing or insecure/preoccupied - by comparing that transcript’s pattern of 
scores with the prototypical pattern that characterises each category. If a transcript proves 
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difficult to classify, it can be assigned two or three alternative categories. Participants who 
display a marked and unusual mixture of contradictory mental states are assigned to 
“cannot classify”, regarded as an abnormal category on the assumption that adults 
generally have a single integrated strategy or state of mind with respect to thinking and 
talking about early attachments. In this case, a ‘forced’ classification into the most 
appropriate organised category or categories is given, secondary to “cannot classify”. 
Participants who show major lapses in monitoring of reasoning or discourse when 
discussing traumatic events are assigned to a fourth category, “unresolved/disorganised”. 
They are also given a best fitting alternative “organised” category. 
All AAI transcripts in this study were scored on five probable experience scales 
and eight state of mind scales. The control interviews were coded by an AAI coder trained 
and certified as reliable (MT). Coding of the interviews with ASD participants was 
divided between MT and another reliable coder. Possible scores on all scales range from 1 
(little evidence of the characteristic being scored) to 9 (extreme evidence). In some cases 
it is not possible to assign a scale score, particularly for experience scales, if the 
participant does not report many specific memories. Of particular interest in the current 
study are the two coherence scales, high scores on which are associated with the 
secure/autonomous category: coherence of mind and coherence of transcript. The scoring 
criteria describe coherence as “connectedness of thought, such that the parts of the 
discourse are clearly related, form a logical whole, or are suitable or suited and adapted to 
context” (Main & Goldwyn, 1998, p.44). Both coherence scores are strongly related to 
overall attachment security, as they are heavily weighted in assigning secure status. All 
AAI transcripts were also scored for reflective function (RF), which is the 
operationalisation of mentalising specifically within the context of attachment. The RF 
criteria were developed by Fonagy et al. (1991; 1997) and scores range from -1 to 9, with 
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higher scores being given to indications of “the subject’s ability to understand 
psychological states, including conscious and unconscious motivations, underlying their 
own reactions and those of others, especially their parents” (Fonagy et al., 1991, p.210). 
Again, high reflective function is strongly related to overall attachment security (Fonagy 
et al., 1991), but unlike coherence scores it is not used to assign interviewees to the 
secure/autonomous category.
• Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 
1999), module 4, is a semi-structured assessment for use with adults with autism who 
have fluent language. It was used in this study to confirm a diagnosis of autism or autism 
spectrum disorder, and to provide a continuous measure of symptom severity in the 
domains of communication and reciprocal social interaction. Although the latter is not its 
intended use, it has been used in this way in other studies (see for example Aldred, Green 
& Adams, 2004; Joseph, Tager-Flusberg & Lord, 2002).
• Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used as a 
brief measure of IQ, to exclude any participants with an IQ below 70 and to explore the 
relationship between attachment and cognitive ability. It has been demonstrated that the 
WASI can provide a valid estimate of full-scale IQ for adults with autism spectrum 
disorders (Minshew, Turner & Goldstein, 2005).
• Theory of mind measures
Two well-established research measures of theory of mind were used. The “reading the 
mind in the eyes” task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) was 
developed with high-functioning autistic adults; participants are asked to match thirty-six 
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pictures of the eye area of human faces to emotion words. The “strange stories” task 
(Happé, 1994) was developed to be used with children with autism, and adapted for adults 
(Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Participants are read a series of scenarios and asked a 
single question at the end of each one to assess their comprehension. In the theory of mind 
stories, success relies on understanding the intention behind a non-literal utterance (such 
as a lie or a double-bluff). For this study, five theory of mind stories were selected, based 
on which stories had most effectively discriminated people with autism from controls in 
an earlier study (Brent, Rios, Happé & Charman, 2004).
• Parallel interview
The parallel interview is included in the Appendix, and the rationale for creating it is 
described in the Introduction. It was designed to follow the structure and demands of the 
AAI as closely as possible, without activating attachment representations. It was 
administered at the very end of the interview session, which meant it was at least two 
hours after the AAI, to reduce the likelihood of participants noticing the similarities in the 
interviews or referring back to their AAI responses. The parallel interview was scored on 
the AAI state of mind scales; transcripts were not assigned to categories, because of the 
lack of “experience” scales and the difficulty of scoring some state of mind scales based 
on anything other than interpersonal experiences. Previous research in a non-clinical 
sample (Crowell et al., 1996) demonstrated that overall classifications on a different 
parallel interview did not overlap significantly with those on the AAI, and that coherence 
scores from each interview were not correlated. Although classifications on Crowell et 
al.’s parallel interview were based on state of mind scales, these scores were not reported 
individually. However, for the parallel interview to give different classifications from the 
AAI, it can be assumed that the state of mind scores were not substantially similar, and 
this is what was tested in the present study. The parallel interview was coded by an AAI 
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coder trained and certified as reliable.
Procedure
Participants were invited to a single interview session with one researcher, which lasted a 
total of around three hours and included breaks between measures as necessary. After 
obtaining informed consent and collecting demographic information, the measures were 
administered in the following order: AAI, ADOS, WASI, the Eyes task, Strange Stories 
and the parallel interview. Twelve participants had recently (within the last year) 
completed the WASI in other research, and six had completed the ADOS, so in these 
cases participants gave permission for their scores to be obtained from the other 
researchers. Because of time constraints, six participants did not complete the parallel 
interview and three did not complete the Strange Stories. One parallel interview was lost 
due to tape malfunction. One participant completed twelve items of the Eyes task then 
asked to stop, so a score was pro-rated. 
Results
Demographics
Participants comprised twelve men and eight women, all white European and aged from 
19 to 60 years old (mean age 34). The age at which they had been given an autism 
spectrum diagnosis ranged from 4 to 58 years old, and the time elapsed since the diagnosis 
ranged from 0 to 16 years, with a mean of 6 years. The fact that most diagnoses were so 
recent is probably accounted for by the fact that fifteen participants had been given a 
diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome, which has only been included in the DSM since 1994. 
Four others had been given diagnoses of autism or high-functioning autism, and one of 
atypical autism. Half of the participants had received their diagnoses in national autism 
specialist centres, while most of the remainder had been diagnosed in local or tertiary 
health services.
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According to the WASI, seven participants had a full-scale IQ in the range 85-115, 
eleven in the range 116-130, and two above 130. The group’s mean full-scale IQ was 118. 
Verbal IQs ranged from 95 to 131 (mean 115) and performance IQs from 87 to 136 (mean 
117).
Socioeconomic status was rated on the Registrar General’s five-category scale 
(OPCS, 1990), according to parents’ professions; where there was a disparity between 
parents, the higher rating was taken. Participants’ professions were not used because of 
the frequent difficulties in education and employment experienced by adults with HFA. 
Four participants’ parents were rated as social class 1 (professional), ten as social class 2 
(intermediate) and six as social class 3 (skilled manual and non-manual). None were rated 
as social classes 4 or 5 (semi-skilled or unskilled). Five participants were currently 
married or cohabiting, and a further four were divorced or separated. Four participants had 
children.
On the ADOS, the criteria for a diagnosis of autism are as follows (autism 
spectrum criteria given in brackets): 3 (2) points in Communication, 6 (4) points in 
Reciprocal Social Interaction and a total of 10 (7) points. Ten participants met criteria for 
autism and six for autism spectrum disorder. The remaining four participants all missed 
autism spectrum criteria by one point. Two of them met criteria for both Communication 
and Reciprocal Social Interaction but their total was one point below the threshold, while 
the other two met criteria for Reciprocal Social Interaction and the total score, but only 
scored one point in Communication. 
It is worth noting that many of the participants had additional psychiatric 
diagnoses, as is to be expected in this population, although the proportion was slightly 
higher than has been reported elsewhere (Barnard, Harvey, Prior & Potter, 2001; Green, 
Gilchrist, Burton & Cox, 2000; Tantam, 2000). Only five participants reported that they 
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had never been given another diagnosis, three had previously been given other diagnoses 
and twelve had current or recurring problems. According to self-reported diagnoses, eight 
were depressed at the time of the interview and three others had previously been 
depressed. Six were currently experiencing an anxiety disorder and two had histories of 
anxiety. Four had other current diagnoses and two had other previous diagnoses, including 
schizoaffective disorder, ADHD and dyslexia. In total, twelve participants had mood 
disorder at the time of the interview. Of the control group, thirteen were experiencing 
mood disorder when they completed the AAI (assessed using the SCID-I and II and the 
BDI). These proportions were not significantly different from each other in a two-tailed 
chi-square test (χ2  = 0.11, df = 1, p = .74).
The group from which the controls were drawn was aged 20-50 (mean age 34) 
with a mean full-scale IQ of 115 (range 88-146). Group members were categorised as 
social classes 1-4 on the Registrar General’s scale (OPCS, 1990), with the majority being 
classes 2 and 3. 
Descriptive data
• Scores on theory of mind measures
Scores on the Eyes task ranged from 17 to 34, with a mean of 25.6 out of 36. On the 
theory of mind Strange Stories, scores ranged from 6 to 10, with a mean of 8.1.
• AAI categories
All participants were assigned to an AAI category on the basis of their interviews, using 
standard criteria (Main & Goldwyn, 1998). In several cases it was necessary to assign two 
or three alternative classifications; in each case the first choice is reported below. The 
three organised categories are secure/autonomous (F), insecure/preoccupied (E) and 
insecure/dismissing (Ds). Participants assigned to one of the disorganised categories - 
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“cannot classify” (CC) or “unresolved” (U) - were also given a forced classification into 
one or more of the organised categories, according to the scoring directions. Participants’ 
and controls’ AAI classifications are reported in Table 1. 
-------------
Table 1 about here
-------------
AAI classifications can be clustered into two groups (secure vs. insecure or disorganised), 
three categories (secure vs. preoccupied vs. dismissing, with disorganised participants 
forced into the best-fitting organised category), four categories (secure vs. preoccupied vs. 
dismissing vs. disorganised) or each category analysed separately (secure vs. preoccupied 
vs. dismissing vs. cannot classify vs. unresolved). Because of the small sample size, we 
focus on reporting two- and three-category analyses here. Two categories can be used to 
explore the simple question of the rate of attachment security, while using more categories 
allows a more detailed exploration of the types of internal working models of attachment 
within the sample.
Attachment classifications of participants and controls were compared using two-
tailed chi-square tests. When three categories were used, the difference between 
participants and controls approached significance (χ2  = 5.33, df = 2, p = .07). The 
difference appears to be due to three controls whose primary classifications are “cannot 
classify” or unresolved but whose secondary classifications are secure. The two-category 
chi-square, comparing secure to insecure and disorganised classifications, showed no 
significant difference between participants and controls (χ2  = 1.29, df = 1, p = .26). 
• AAI scale scores
All AAI transcripts were scored on five “probable experience” scales and eight “state of 
mind” scales, all of which range from 1 to 9. The “metacognitive monitoring” scale was 
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not used because of its overlap with reflective function. In some cases it was not possible 
to assign scores for one or more scales, particularly for experience scales, if participants 
did not report many specific memories. Several of the scales are scored separately for 
mother and father; in every case the two scores were averaged to give a single score for 
each scale. AAI transcripts were also scored for reflective function (Fonagy et al., 1997); 
possible scores range from -1 to 9. State of mind scores and reflective function scores for 
participants and controls are summarised in Table 2; none of the probable experience 
scores showed significant differences between the groups or correlations with other 
measures, so are not given in the table.
-------------
Table 2 about here
-------------
• Parallel interview scale scores
The parallel interviews were scored on the same state of mind scales as the AAIs, with the 
exception of “unresolved loss/trauma” because the parallel interview did not probe for this 
explicitly. Parallel interviews were also scored for metacognitive monitoring; it was not 
appropriate to code them separately for reflective function because the interview did not 
provide explicit opportunities to reflect on internal states. As can be seen, no participants 
showed any evidence of metacognitive monitoring in these interviews so would be 
unlikely to score for reflective function. Scale scores for the parallel interviews are 
summarised in Table 3.
-------------
Table 3 about here
-------------
Normality
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Several of the continuous variables differed significantly from normal distributions, 
according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and their skewness ratios. All analyses were 
therefore carried out using non-parametric tests (Spearman’s rho, Mann-Whitney U, 
Wilcoxon’s signed ranks test). They were also repeated using parametric alternatives 
(Pearson’s r, independent-samples and paired-samples t-tests respectively), which are 
known to be reasonably robust to deviations from normality. In all cases the overall 
patterns of results were the same so parametric analyses are not reported separately.
Research questions
• Can adults with autism engage with the AAI? If so, are they less likely than adults 
without autism to be classified as secure?
The participants in the present study were all able to engage with the AAI sufficiently to 
provide transcripts that could be scored according to the usual criteria, and the general 
pattern of their classifications is described above. An expected distribution of AAI 
classifications in adults without autism was obtained from the meta-analysis by van 
IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (1996), which gives distributions for both clinical 
and non-clinical samples. The non-clinical samples are reported separately for men and 
women, although the distributions are not markedly different; the male sample was chosen 
for comparison because the present sample contained more men than women. The meta-
analysis reports CC and U together as one disorganised category. Using chi-square tests, 
the present participants’ AAI classifications differ significantly from the non-clinical 
meta-analysis whether viewed as two categories (χ2 = 15.18, df = 1, p < .001), three 
categories (χ2 = 15.43, df = 2, p < .001) or four categories (χ2 = 15.22, df = 3, p = .002). In 
the cases of three and four categories, two and three cells respectively had expected values 
below five, so these results should be interpreted with caution.
The clinical sample of van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (1996) was 
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composed of a broad mixture, from adults with personality disorders, to abusive parents, 
to parents who did not themselves have clinical problems but whose children had conduct 
disorder or sleep disorder. This was felt to be a more appropriate comparison group for the 
present sample, given their high level of past and present clinical difficulties as well as 
autism. Chi-square tests comparing the present sample to the clinical distributions show 
no significant differences for two (χ2 = 0.07, df = 1, p = .79), three (χ2 = 0.30, df = 2, p = .
862) or four categories (χ2 = 1.42, df = 3, p = .70). In every case, one cell had an expected 
value below 5; this is because of the low prevalence of secure attachment in clinical 
samples. Again, this means that the results should be interpreted carefully, although the 
observed and expected values were strikingly similar.
• Will adults with autism respond to the AAI in a way that primarily reflects their states 
of mind with respect to attachment, or will their responses be more strongly 
influenced by their general discourse style?
Participants’ state of mind scores for the AAI and parallel interviews were compared 
using Spearman’s rho correlations, shown in Table 3. It was not possible to do this for 
derogation and reflective function/metacognitive monitoring because no participants 
scored above 1 on the parallel interview. As can be seen, there is significant agreement 
between scales across the two interviews for anger, passivity and lack of memory. No 
other variables are significantly correlated across the two interviews.
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests comparing participants’ state of mind scores across 
the AAI and parallel interview are summarised in Table 3. Obviously the two interviews 
differ for metacognitive monitoring/reflective functioning and derogation, as all 
participants scored 1 on these scales in the parallel interview. Both coherence scores are 
also significantly higher in the parallel interview. 
• How are the AAI responses of adults with autism similar to and different from 
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those of adults without autism?
Participants’ and controls’ scores on the continuous AAI scales were compared using 
Mann-Whitney U tests, summarised in Table 2. Participants’ and controls’ scores differ 
significantly (p < .05) on reflective function, coherence of transcript, coherence of mind 
and unresolved loss.
Although the two-category chi-square test had shown no significant difference in 
attachment security between participants and controls, the fact that some disorganised 
controls had a secondary classification as secure had led to concern that this might falsely 
inflate any difference between the groups. That is, those classified as secure would be 
expected to have higher scores for coherence and reflective function than those classified 
as insecure. Because of this, the analyses were repeated with only the 17 participants and 
11 controls whose primary AAI classification was insecure or disorganised. In this 
subsample, participants and controls still differ significantly on reflective function (p < .
05, effect size 0.75), coherence of transcript (p < .01, effect size 0.95) and coherence of 
mind (p < .01, effect size 0.88). However, the difference on unresolved loss is no longer 
significant. The larger effect sizes seem to be because the three secure autistic participants 
scored high on these three scales relative to the rest of the group, so reduced the difference 
from controls.
Although there is no space in the present paper for a discussion of the quality of 
the participants’ responses to the AAI, brief excerpts are provided in Table 4 to give a 
flavour of the transcripts.
-------------
Table 4 about here
-------------
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• How are AAI responses of adults with autism related to their autistic 
symptomatology, IQ and theory of mind?
Scores on the two AAI coherence scales, as well as reflective function scores, are strongly 
related to overall attachment security (Fonagy et al., 1991; Roisman, Padrón, Sroufe & 
Egeland, 2002). This was the case in the present sample, with participants and controls 
classified as secure tending to have higher scores on these scales. Therefore, any 
relationship between participants’ scores on these continuous scales and other variables of 
interest (ADOS, IQ and theory of mind) would suggest that these variables are influencing 
the likelihood of participants being classified as secure. Spearman’s rho correlations are 
reported in Table 5. Coherence of transcript is significantly negatively correlated with 
ADOS communication score; no other correlations reach significance.
-------------
Table 5 about here
-------------
Discussion
This study was an exploration of whether adults with autism would be able to 
engage with the AAI enough to provide interviews that could be scored and classified. As 
the participants were clearly able to do this, the more specific research questions allow us 
to speculate about the meaning of their responses and attachment classifications.
Given that the participants were able to engage with the AAI, the first question 
was how their responses would be classified and how this pattern compared to a sample 
without autism. Three of the twenty participants were classified as secure; this is a lower 
rate of security than is found in non-clinical samples, but does not differ significantly from 
the clinical meta-analytic sample of van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (1996) 
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that was used for comparison. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about how this 
finding sits alongside evidence of normal levels of attachment security in infants and 
children with HFA. One the one hand, secure attachment was not entirely absent in this 
sample and was certainly present at a rate comparable with other clinical samples. On the 
other hand, a far smaller proportion of the current participants was classified as secure, 
compared to 53% of children with autism assessed in the Strange Situation (Rutgers et al., 
2004). This may either be due to participants’ autism per se or to the high rate of mood 
disorders and other diagnoses within the sample, as mood disorder is known to be 
associated with insecure and disorganised attachment. This question could be clarified by 
further research among adults with HFA who do not have other clinical difficulties, 
although these people may be the exception rather than the rule. It is worth noting here 
that all but one of the eight participants categorised as “unresolved” or “cannot classify” 
had current mood disorder. Given the underlying question about the validity of using the 
AAI with this sample, it is also possible that the AAI did not activate attachment 
representations in all participants, although as a group they appeared to respond differently 
to the AAI than to the parallel interview. This could be explored by the parallel use of 
other adult attachment measures, as discussed below.
There is some evidence that participants’ responses to the AAI were influenced by 
their general discourse style, as shown by the correlations in scale scores across the AAI 
and the parallel interview. That is, anger, passivity and lack of memory appeared to be 
characteristics of the speakers rather than specifically reflecting state of mind with respect 
to attachment. However, other characteristics of participants’ discourse did vary across 
interviews, including both of the coherence scores which are strongly associated with 
overall attachment security. This suggests that aspects of their response to the AAI are 
influenced by their distinctive narrative styles, probably associated with their autism, but 
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that the AAI still manages to tap into a specific state of mind with respect to attachment. 
This is an indicator of the discriminant validity of the AAI.
Importantly, there was no overlap between the scales that correlated across the 
different interviews and those that differentiated autistic participants from non-autistic 
controls. As predicted, there were clear differences between participants and controls in 
the two coherence scores and reflective function, while most other scales did not even 
approach significance, particularly when secure participants were excluded. Reflective 
function is a measure of mentalising, a central difficulty for people with autism, so it was 
expected that the participants would score lower than the controls on this measure 
(although, surprisingly, reflective function scores did not correlate significantly with the 
theory of mind measures). The coherence scores are based on Grice’s (1975) 
conversational principles of quality, quantity, relation and manner; many participants 
appeared to struggle particularly with quantity (responding either at great length or 
extremely tersely), and relation (moving repeatedly onto irrelevant topics). 
Coherence and reflective function scores were used as an index of attachment 
security. Coherence of transcript was correlated with ADOS communication score, which 
is understandable as both are measures of appropriate reciprocal conversation, although 
they focus on slightly different aspects (the ADOS score includes nonverbal 
communication). It is interesting that coherence of transcript also shows some suggestion 
of a correlation with full-scale IQ, rather than verbal IQ; the interpretation of this is not 
clear, and as it did not reach significance it needs to be replicated. Both of these findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that AAI security would be related to autistic 
symptomatology and IQ, as is the case with autistic children’s security in the Strange 
Situation. There is little evidence here, however, that theory of mind measures are related 
to attachment measures, even to reflective functioning which is explicitly a measure of 
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mentalising (although the correlation with the Eyes task approaches significance). This 
lack of association is particularly interesting when set alongside the finding that the autism 
group and the control group differed significantly on coherence and reflective function 
scores. Two interpretations are possible. It may be that autistic symptomatology and 
mentalising ability are continuously correlated across all people with and without autism, 
but the measures used are better suited to picking up gross between-group differences 
rather than subtle within-group variations; this is discussed in more detail below. This is 
consistent with the observation that all of the correlations between security measures 
(reflective function, coherence of mind and coherence of transcript) and participant 
characteristics (ADOS scores, IQ and mentalising) were in the predicted direction but few 
were significant or even approached significance. The alternative conclusion is that there 
may be gross group differences between people with autism (low reflective functioning 
and mentalising, high autistic symptomatology) and people without autism, rather than 
each factor existing on a continuum. This latter idea does not seem to be consistent with 
existing findings about attachment and mentalising in typical development, but 
circumstances may be different for people with autism, particularly given the suggestion 
that they may form secure attachments in a different manner from typically-developing 
children and adults. Although attachment and mentalising have been explored together in 
typical samples, attachment-based mentalising measures like reflective function have not 
been compared to more traditional theory of mind measures. Overall, however, the general 
lack of association between attachment measures and these other variables 
(symptomatology, theory of mind and IQ) should make us more confident that the AAI 
was genuinely tapping into attachment representations in the participants, rather than 
acting as a proxy for other abilities or deficits. 
Limitations
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This was an exploratory study using the AAI with adults with autism for the first 
time. Participants were self-selected, with a higher proportion of women and more people 
with mood disorders than might be expected from other research in this area (Barnard et 
al., 2001; Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993). As it was not known at the outset whether the 
participants would be able to engage with the AAI at all, the sample size was relatively 
small, although the analyses had satisfactory power and findings were generally clear-cut. 
In all cases, the same patterns of results were replicated across parametric and non-
parametric analyses. The lack of association between measures in the case of the last 
research question could be due to limitations in the sensitivity of the theory of mind and 
autism measures. Although the ADOS is a well established measure of autistic 
symptomatology, its intended use is diagnostic, and the brief duration may not be enough 
to pick up all of the relevant information among participants with less obvious difficulties; 
a self-report symptom measure could have picked up some more subtle or well-disguised 
difficulties. There appeared to be a ceiling effect in participants’ scores on the Strange 
Stories, although not on the Eyes task. However, the WASI is a well-established measure 
whose validity has been established in people with HFA (Minshew et al., 2005), and like 
the ADOS and theory of mind measures, it showed little or no relationship with reflective 
function or coherence. This does suggest that IQ may really be unrelated to attachment 
status in adults with HFA. There is some evidence among children with autism of a 
threshold effect, that is those with IQ below 70 are less likely to be secure but those above 
this level are not (Rutgers et al., 2004), while there is only limited evidence for a 
continuous relationship where the likelihood of attachment security increases with IQ 
(Rogers et al., 1991). This may also hold for adults, that beyond a certain level of 
intelligence other factors are more relevant in determining attachment security. The 
parallel interview was developed specifically for this study and was not used in the control 
23
group, so there are some questions about how it would be expected to relate to AAI 
responses in a sample without autism. For example, one concern is that it was shorter than 
the AAI, which could account for the difference in coherence scores. Ideally, it would 
have been preferable to have all the same measures for the controls as for the participants, 
so that the patterns of relationships in discourse style, IQ and so on could be directly 
compared across both groups. 
Future research directions
It was suggested in the Introduction that children with autism who form secure 
attachments could be doing so in different ways from other children. The same may yet 
hold true of autistic adults with secure attachments, although the present study found no 
evidence of this. A study with more participants might be able to identify a sufficiently 
large group of secure adults with autism to allow group comparisons, rather than needing 
to rely on continuous measures as proxies for attachment security as this study has done. 
It was predicted that the AAI would be a particularly difficult task for adults with autism 
because of its heavy reliance on discourse coherence, mentalising and conversational 
pragmatics. There are now semi-projective measures of attachment in adults (e.g. George 
& West, 2001) that rely less strongly on narrative than the AAI. If adults with autism 
demonstrated the same level of attachment security on these measures as found in the 
current study, it would give a measure of convergent validity and demonstrate that they 
were really being scored according to their states of mind with respect to attachment, 
rather than on how difficult they found the AAI. Using the AAI among adults with autism 
for the first time, this study has succeeded in demonstrating that the participants were able 
to respond to the interview in a way that could be classified, that some of them could be 
classified as securely attached and that their responses were at least partly independent of 
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their autism; it has also highlighted some interesting areas for future investigation.
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Appendix: Parallel interview
[You've already told me that when you were younger you lived in X and Y.] Could you 
start by helping me to get oriented to the houses you lived in, where they were and so on? 
If you could tell me where your room was in the house, and whether you shared it?
I'd like you to try to describe your bedroom in the house where you lived as a young child, 
as far back as you remember.
Now I'd like to ask you to choose five adjectives or words that describe the room that you 
had, as far back as you can remember – as early as you can go, but say age 5 – 12 is fine. I 
know this may take a bit of time, so go ahead and think for a minute, then I'd like to ask 
you why you chose them. I'll write each one down as you give them to me.
Okay, now let me go through some more questions about your description of the room you 
had as a child. You used the word [...] to describe the room: are there any memories or 
incidents that come to mind, that would help me to understand why you chose that word?
Now I'd like to ask you to choose five adjective or words that describe the main room, the 
living room or the lounge, in the house you lived in at that time. I know this may take a bit 
of time, so go ahead and think again for a minute, then I'd like to ask you why you chose 
them. I'll write each one down as you give them to me.
Okay, now let me go through some more questions about your description of the living 
room when you were a child. You used the word [...] to describe the room: are there any 
memories or incidents that come to mind, that would help me to understand why you 
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chose that word?
Now I wonder if you could tell me, of all the different rooms that you had as a child (OR 
of those two rooms, the bedroom and living room), which did you like the best, and why? 
What did you like less about the other room(s)?
When you spent time in your room as a young child, what would you do in there?
[What do you remember about moving house as a child?] Was there ever a time when 
your bedroom was redecorated? Or any big changes, new things in it or things being 
moved around? Did you ever want to change anything about your room?
Can you remember being in your room when there was a storm? Where in the room were 
you? What did it look like? 
Were there any other rooms that you liked to spend time in when you were a young child?
Now I'd like to ask you about your room (where you live/as it is) now. What is it like? 
What do you think of it?
If you could change three things about the room you have now, what would they be?
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Table 1: AAI categories for participants and controls
Three categories
AAI classification F E Ds
participants 3 8 9
controls 9 3 8
Five categories
AAI classification F E Ds CC U
participants 3 4 5 4 4
controls 6 0 7 1 6
F: secure/autonomous, E: insecure/preoccupied, Ds: insecure/dismissing, CC: cannot  
classify, U: unresolved
37
Table 2: Scores on continuous AAI scales and reflective function scores
Mean (SD) Effect size
AAI scales Autism Controls Autism vs. controls
RF 2.78 (1.75) 3.90 (1.77) 0.61*
Coherence: transcript 3.35 (1.73) 4.65 (1.53) 0.75*
Idealising 2.50 (1.69) 2.21 (1.30)
Lack memory 2.70 (2.66) 3.13 (2.33)
Anger 2.20 (1.56) 2.00 (1.39)
Passivity 3.10 (2.02) 2.93 (1.65)
Derogation: parents 1.60 (1.04) 1.71 (0.98)
Derogation: attachment 1.75 (1.12) 2.40 (2.12)
Coherence of mind 3.43 (1.74) 4.60 (1.56) 0.67*
Unresolved: loss 2.42 (1.98) 3.61 (2.02) 0.47*
Unresolved: trauma 2.65 (1.62) 2.75 (2.44)
* p < .05 difference between group means on Mann-Whitney U test
Effect sizes of differences between group means are only given where significant
Autism n = 20, controls n = 20
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Table 3: Participants’ state of mind scores for the parallel interview, and correlations 
with AAI state of mind scores
Parallel interview scores Parallel mean (SD AAI mean (SD) Correlation
Metacognitive monitoring 1 2.78 (1.75)** NA
Coherence of transcript 5.23 (2.13) 3.35 (1.73)* -.14
Idealising 2.23 (1.96) 2.50 (1.69) .27
Lack memory 1.85 (1.91) 2.70 (2.66) .71**
Anger 1.92 (1.38) 2.20 (1.56) .79***
Passivity 2.85 (2.08) 3.10 (2.02) .65*
Derogation 1 1.60 (1.04)* NA
Coherence of mind 5.38 (2.26) 3.43 (1.74)* -.04
All participants scored 1 on “metacognitive monitoring” and “derogation” in the  
parallel interview.
NA: could not be calculated, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Correlations are Spearman’s rho. Highlighted AAI means are significantly different from 
parallel interview means (Wilcoxon signed ranks test).
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Table 4: Sample quotations from participants’ responses to AAI questions
Participant classified as secure
Q6. When you were upset as a child, what would you do?
Erm, I would cry and then I would find my mum, [participant laughs] and I would put my 
head on her lap and cry. [participant laughs] (mm) Which is nice.
Q11. Why do you think your parents behaved the way they did during your childhood?
My mum saw, like, things that were hard for me and couldn’t do so, you know more than 
another person so she felt she had to be more protective than another person. Which at the 
time served its purpose but then, sometimes you know when you then develop past your 
stage it takes them a while to realise that you’ve developed past that stage.
Participant classified as secure
Q6. [sigh] It depends what I was upset about. Er [3] could be fairly moody. I did have sort 
of temper tantrums, specially if I was playing with things like Lego or Meccano and it 
didn’t go together the way I wanted. Everything would get smashed or thrown across the 
room. Uh [2] other times you know sort of, if it was more emotive things I'd tend to sort of 
shut myself away. Uh, just hide myself out. Uh, those days and you know specially sort of, 
you know I used to hide away with books and, just sort of, spend more time with myself.
Q11. Uh, I think probably it was actually pretty much reflective of their own [2] 
upbringing as well. Uh, both, you know, having said I didn't meet my maternal grandfather 
but, both are pretty systematic [sic] of their own nurturing. Uh, my mother’s family was 
you know sort of all those things I described, warm, supportive through. Uh, and sort of 
very, close-knit. Whereas my father's family were, more, pretty much aloof, uh [2] 
disjointed shall we say as a family that sort of you know it was, a lot of loneliness through 
each other. Uh, my grandfather, though, you know, a great guy, uh, had seen a lot of 
problems through his life, you know he lost nine brothers in the first and second world 
war, didn’t have very good relationship with his sisters on his own mother's death and, so, 
sort of was pretty distant through. Uh, so I think you know sort of, they, the way they 
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were, you know was sort of, pretty much, by environments they were raised in. Uh, I think 
you know, my father's attitude specially as we were younger was that, he wanted to try 
and, better improve himself, and didn’t realise perhaps quite the cost, that, it was around. 
[2]
Participant classified as dismissing
Q6. Um [2] well I'd cry. [participant laughs]
Q11. Um, so, I mean part of the reason was that most of the time they tried to be like 
normal parents and I think at times they thought, um they obviously realised I did have 
some sort of problem, (mm) and so were sort of trying their best to look after me.
Participant classified as dismissing
Q6. [7] I don’t know, I can’t really remember. Cry maybe, I don’t know. Not quite sure.
Q11. [3] Because they thought that was the right way to bring somebody up. [4]
Participant classified as preoccupied
Q6. Um [2] I tended to, when I was crying I usually went off in a huff, (right) like, like 
kids do, but when, when we were all young and my parents were still together of course 
um, we all, me [Brother 1] and [Brother 2] were all in one bedroom. (OK) Me and 
[Brother 1] had a bunk bed, [Brother 2] had his own little bed. (right) Almost like a cot. 
Um but, so it was quite hard for me to run up to my own room by myself, but um, one 
thing I did always sort of try and do was just, um, not talk, which is what kids do really, 
you know when a kid's bad he does, “I’m not talking to you, I’m not talking to you.” And I 
still feel that way sometimes now, I mean, sure my, me and my parents do still sometimes 
have silly arguments about things and when I do I tend to go off in a huff. (right) So, yeah, 
has to be one of my patterns t-. Sort of with the thought process that um, I’ll go away 
before I say something I really regret. (right) In a way. It might be “I hate you”, or, that 
sort of thing. You know you don’t mean that about your parents. 
Q11. Um, well that thing I told you about, my mother's meeting with Miss, with Mrs 
[Teacher] earlier, (mm) when she said she was concerned that might have been influential. 
(mm) She might have, she kept it obviously very secret because, mind you it is quite easy 
to keep a secret from a six-year-old, um, she probably thought to herself, what if [Own 
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name] were to know these things, that Mrs [Teacher] thinks he’s got problems, (mm) and 
other people thinks he’s got problems, so, I suppose in a way my mum was, I suppose 
another adjective for my mum’s relationship with me would be ‘protective’. (right) 
Because, you know she, perhaps she saw that um, she might even have thought to herself, 
problem equals genius. (right) Cos I’ve always thought um, genius is a very subjective 
word, it doesn't necess- it doesn’t mean, really smart, necessarily, it can mean other things 
like um, you see things differently. Like I do, like Asperger's people do. Um, so, the way, 
a sens-, a sensitive characteristic, or characters can develop, uh, how, how y- you know 
how you move your body by flicking your fingers, it's just your creativity then let it be. 
(OK) So, she might have been protective in that way, and my dad as well. [2] Cos um, my 
dad always says that he doesn’t know things, basically, he keeps on saying things like um, 
nobody told me about this, (right) that you’ve got on Tuesday, nobody told me that you 
were going to London on Wednesday. Um [2] but my mum, my mum ret-, retaliates by 
saying um, you should know them anyway, you don’t need to find out from people, you 
should know what’s happening with your children. You know that's, that maybe have been 
another thing which um led to the conflict between my mum and my dad, and eventually 
their split-up. 
Participant classified as preoccupied
Q6. [2] Don't know. [3] I don't think I cried very much. (mm) I do r- I rem- cos I remember 
occasion when I when she'd been particularly nasty to me, (mm) and um, and w- my sister 
and I were both in bed and I was crying, and, my sister went down to, to tell my mother 
the, that I w- that I was crying, and I think she came back and ap- and I think she came up 
and actually apologised. Which made me cry more than ever. (right) But again I d- but 
again it's something I don't know w- I don't know whether it actually happened or whether 
it's something I dreamt or fantasised. (sure) [2] Um but uh but, as for what else I did when 
I f-, what did what did I do if I, [2] I don't know. I really can't remember what I used to do 
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if I was upset I mean, may maybe it was such a [2] such a common everyday thing for me 
to feel upset that um, it was something you know sort of like um, taken for granted, you 
know just sort of [2] part of my psyche. [2] I mean when I was, I remember when I was 
about eight, (mm) I, I used I used to feel I I, not sure whether I felt or thought, that the life 
I was living was a dream that one day I'd wake up. But interestingly the only specific 
change I envisaged, that I w- walked up when I woke up from this dream, was I'd be a boy. 
(right) I don't know why I mean you'd think you'd think I'd envisage all sorts of changes 
wouldn't you? I mean I used to r- write, I don't know whether I ever gave them to them but 
I used to write it, uh, lists of birthday and Christmas presents, such as "don't row, don't 
favour [Sister], try to love me". [2] Can't remember whether I actually gave them to them, 
I'm, I'm not sure how they'd have reacted if I had, but. [3] And um [2] w- a- at about the 
same time I was sent to a child guidance clinic, and again I can't remember why, but uh, I 
mean I was taken uh I was taken away from it uh, when I was ten cos my mother didn't 
want me to miss any more school, bef- before I took the eleven plus. You know the eleven 
plus exam which kids used to have to take? (yeah) Um, last year of primary school. Um 
[3] and um [2] about the o- ca- the only thing I remember about that, there's three things I 
remember, is that th- th- the um, psychiatrist I suppose she was, [cough] said that, most 
pe- most of her children most of the children, either played, there were various toys to play 
with, (mm) there was I remember there was a sandpit that you could dig up, (mm) uh, or 
talked and she said I used to they said I did b- I did both. (mm) And she said oh, and she 
said I I I, I, I w- I, seemed to be quite loyal to my fa- c- uh, I think she said I felt seemed to 
feel uncomfortable if I had to say anything against them, so there was so, so, so, there 
certainly was enough to s-, to say against them, in all conscious, a-, um, and um, also that 
I asked her who gave, you know she had a diploma on the on the wall (mm) with her 
degrees on it, and I asked her who gave it to her now very uncharacteristically got angry 
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she said nobody gave it to her she worked for it. (right) I suppose she must have had to 
work sh- maybe she w- maybe she had to work very hard. (yeah) And um [2] that's all I 
remember about the child guidance clinic. Except that the Christmas after I left, um I I 
came back to see everybody, and told them and told them everything I'd got for Christmas 
though the only thing I can actually remember was a c- copy of Jane Eyre [2] er which my 
i- in which mother had written “love from Mummy”! S- which has always ma- which has 
which has always made me feel very sceptical of the value of saying "love from" or f- 
people telling you they love you, cos she o- cos she obviously didn't, (yeah) and um, one 
one of the staff not not the psychiatrist somebody else, said oh saying “some people have 
all the luck”. Which I didn't think I which I didn't think applied to me. [3] Um. [3] Can't 
remember why I t- can't remember why I told you that. [laugh] I'm not sure I'm not sure 
whether I told the psychol- the psychiatrist about b- about feeling I was li-, living a dream.
Q11. [2] [sigh] [2] Well, I think um, neither of them I think neither of them got any 
support from the other. (mm) And as I said before I think maybe the experience of having 
a child was not what they were hoping or expecting. Uh, I think possibly the pyloric 
stenosis and every and everything and [2] um, meant, you know, meant that my mother 
was unable to b- b- to bond with me and sort of and as I said don't know how old I, I was 
by the time we f- g- we finally c- came to go back to London and my father saw me I 
don't, I don't know whether he um, whether he whether he came out to [Place of birth] to 
see me there or, and, sin- since it was since it was not long after the war and he had been 
called up of course, (mm) though he was never sent abroad cos he was his health wasn't up 
to it, think he was categorised as C3 whatever they called it, but he might still have been 
serving, he might not have been able to get away. I mean I assume he was informed of my 
birth, but. See the thing is and, but that this is all speculation you see, I mean, after my 
mother, when my mother was in hospital, th- the first half of October 1995, and I went to 
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see her, and she'd had she'd had this kind of complete personality transplant. And the only 
reason I went to see her was I was going to an antique fair up in [Place] and she was at the 
[Hospital], and, and um, it you know it was just a bus ride away or even could even walk 
there really if, if you were feeling energetic. And I thought “oh god I suppose I'd better go 
and see her”. And she and she and she greeted me in quite a friendly way and even 
introduced me to the nurse, and um, couldn't, couldn't believe it. And anyway during that 
period, f- for a week, couple of weeks, (mm) she actually did apologise for having been so 
horrible to me. And I really wish I'd asked her why she was, but you know it was just it 
was so unexpected I sort of muttered “oh, that's alright”. So I missed the opportunity.
Participant classified as preoccupied
Q6. Um, it was usually, just go to my room [2] and [2] u- read a book or, or watch um, 
watch television, t- try to hide myself away from it all, because I was somewhere where I 
knew I was secure.
Q11. Um, w- w- well um, well I think as I said, because just they were, they were very, 
they were very concerned all about, all about n-, all about the sheltered life I was living, 
and I wasn’t like m-, [laugh] like other kids that was m-, and, u-, and they were they were 
worried in case I might become very isolated as I got older. [3]
Participant classified as unresolved (secondary classification as preoccupied)
Q6. Erm, I'd pull my hair out or hit my head on the wall. And um yeah I'd pull my hair out 
or hit my head on the wall, or cry, or all of them.
Q11. Well, they didn't know I was autistic but they they knew I was special, and my mum 
always said she had a feeling I was autistic. But why they behaved the way they did was, I 
think that when I was little, [2] you know, I was cute and as I was got older I became a 
teenager, which in- which was which they saw as a monster maybe. You know once I 
became a teenager they said that I became more difficult and my behaviour went 
unmanageable so maybe they managed it in the only way they knew how, who knows. [2]
Participant classified as unresolved (secondary classification as preoccupied)
Q6. [5] Um [12] pretend I wasn’t crying. [3] And I'd get away if I possibly could so I 
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could be on my own.
Q11. Because they just thought I was an awkward little brat and, they were, treating me in 
the ways they thought would (mm) either persuade or frighten me into what they called 
good behaviour.
Participant classified as unresolved (secondary classification as dismissing)
Q6. Throw tantrums. (right) Be resentful maybe? (OK) When my f- when father used to 
hit me. Wasn’t making any difference. I had to be sent away. [sigh] Yeah, more or less out 
of par- parental control. (right) I think what I should of done was to um, was to have um 
sent you um [2] the er write-up, about my childhood.
Q11. It was out of sheer frustration. That’s all that’s all I can s-, [cough] I can say, they 
behaved as reasonably as they they could against me. I don’t think there’s no um, child 
guidance as there is now. [2] You know like you see these programmes when the child is 
being disruptive [2] give him or her time out, put them in the room, until they calm down. 
(yeah) No si- child psychologists. Don’t know whether that’s your, well it wouldn’t be 
your role. It, y- you’re probably a a a research um, you know like um, facilitator. Is that 
right?
Interviewer’s words shown in italics. Pauses shown as number of seconds in square 
brackets.
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Table 5: Correlations between participants’ coherence and reflective function scores and 
other variables of interest
Variables Coherence of 
transcript
Coherence of 
mind
Reflective 
function
ADOS communication  -.48, p = .03* -.36, p = .13 -.23, p = .34
ADOS RSI -.31, p = .18 -.16, p = .50 -.29, p = .22
Verbal IQ .36, p = .11 .30, p = .21 .25, p = .28
Performance IQ .25, p = .30 .19, p = .43 .18, p = .44
Full-scale IQ .41, p = .08 .25, p = .29 .23, p = .32
Strange stories mental .37, p = .14 .21, p = .42 .26, p = .32
Eyes task .29, p = .21 .27, p = .25 .38, p = .10
RSI: reciprocal social interaction
*p < .05
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